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#### SHA-3 Candidate

#### Not appear in 2<sup>nd</sup> round

#### Bruce Schneier doesn't know:

"(...) I am (...) most surprised not to see LANE."

#### Actually, we don't know either...

## But, we do know something.

## **Our Results**

# Semi-free-start collisions on full compression function of LANE

	Time	Memory
LANE-256	<b>2</b> <sup>96</sup>	<b>2</b> <sup>80</sup>
LANE-512	<b>2</b> <sup>224</sup>	<b>2</b> <sup>128</sup>



# **Attack Method**

#### **Improved rebound attack**

- 1. Apply inbound phase at several places
- 2. Merge inbounds
- 3. Run outbound phase

# can satisfy longer differential path

# **LANE-256 Round Operation**

#### **Two AES states**



#### 2x AES round



SwapColumns

Only dependency in two AES states. (slow diffusion)

Enables us to merge several inbound phases.









![](_page_13_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_14_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_15_Figure_1.jpeg)

Lots of freedom remains.

![](_page_16_Figure_0.jpeg)

# It's even easier for LANE-512

# It's even easier for LANE-512

## Summary

• Semi-free-start collision attacks on full LANE-256 and LANE-512.

More details in the ASIACRYPT'09 paper:

Rebound Attack on the Full LANE Compression Function Kristian Matusiewicz, María Naya-Plasencia, Ivica Nikolić, Yu Sasaki, Martin Schläffer

Thanks for your attention !