

Hash Functions and Cayley Graphs: the end of the story?

Christophe Petit

Jean-Jacques Quisquater

UCL Crypto Group



The dream




Recently



Hash functions (1990-...) designed by randomness?



Zemor-Tillich hash functions 1994-2009



Zémor-Tillich hash function (CRYPTO'94)

- ▶ Parameters $n \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $P(X)$ irreducible of degree n . Let

$$A_0 := \begin{pmatrix} X & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad A_1 := \begin{pmatrix} X & X+1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Then $h_{ZT}(m_1 m_2 \dots m_k) := A_{m_1} A_{m_2} \dots A_{m_k} \bmod P(X)$.

- ▶ Elegant design, graph and group-theoretical interpretations of main hash properties
- ▶ One of the oldest hash functions
- ▶ Full cryptanalysis of related schemes [TZ93, TZ08, PLQ08] but only partial attacks on ZT [CP94, G96, AK98, SGGB00, PQTZ09]



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Grassl et al's collision attack [GIMS09]

- ▶ Change generators for

$$A'_0 := A_0 = \begin{pmatrix} X & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad A'_1 := A_0^{-1} A_1 A_0 = \begin{pmatrix} X+1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

- ▶ Observe that the hash of any palindrome has the form

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} a^2 & b \\ b & d^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

- ▶ Fix $a = P(X)$. Recover b, d and a preimage of this matrix, using an algorithm of Mesirov-Sweet (JoNT'87)
- ▶ Build the collision

$$A'_0 M A'_0 = A'_1 M A'_1.$$



Second preimages for Zémor-Tillich

- ▶ Observe that if $a = 0 \pmod{P(X)}$ then

$$\begin{pmatrix} X & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} a^2 & b \\ b & d^2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & X+d^2 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad \begin{pmatrix} a^2 & b \\ b & d^2 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} X & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ X+d^2 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

and both matrices have order 2.

- ▶ We obtain collisions to the void message
 \Rightarrow **second preimages** for any message



Preimages for Zémor-Tillich

- ▶ Given $\begin{pmatrix} A & B \\ C & D \end{pmatrix} \in SL(2, \mathbb{F}_{2^n})$,
- ▶ Write $\begin{pmatrix} A & B \\ C & D \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \alpha & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} X & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \beta \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} X & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}^3 \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \gamma & 1 \end{pmatrix}$
with

$$\begin{cases} \alpha = (DX + X + B)/(XB) \\ \beta = (B + X^3)/X^2 \\ \gamma = (X + B + X^2B + AX)/(XB) \end{cases}$$

- ▶ As $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \sum \alpha_i & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \prod \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \alpha_i & 1 \end{pmatrix}$
it is enough to precompute preimages for a set $\{\alpha_i\}$ forming a basis of \mathbb{F}_{2^n}

Precomputing part

- ▶ Until we have a basis of elements $\{\alpha_i\}$
 - ▶ Apply [MS87]'s algorithm to $a_i = P(X)Q_i(X)$ where $Q_i(X)$ random irreducible of degree R
 - ▶ If it succeeds, recover the corresponding preimage and value $\alpha_i = X + d_i^2$
 - ▶ If this new α_i is independent of the previous ones, add it to the list
- ▶ Remarks:
 - ▶ [MS87]'s algorithm guaranteed to succeed only when a is irreducible. However, we provide evidence that it succeeds with probability about $1/2$ when $a_i = P(X)Q_i(X)$.
 - ▶ If we cannot get a full basis, we increase the degree of $Q_i(X)$



Conclusion I



Conclusion II

- **Zemor-Tillich is completely broken**
- **Preimage in few seconds with a small program**
- **Length of the preimage around 100.000 bits**

End?

- **No!**
- **Changing the generators**
- **More generators**
- **Working in other algebra**
- **A new field!**